Johan Elg's paper on the Wargaming for Midway

Recently I acquired a new follower on my academia.edu account: Johan Elg. Looking at his profile I discovered that he has published a paper (1) , in Swedish, on the Midway wargames. The blurp on Johan's academia.edu site says of this paper (in English):

This is a chapter on how wargaming was used by the Imperial Japanese Navy in their planning process leading up to the battle of Midway in June 1942. The text uses Japanese sources such as the diary of Admiral Ugaki Matome, responsible for the wargaming sessions, and the official Japanese military history work on World War II. The text indicates that much of the previous critique of this particular wargaming are rather superficial and also from certain sources. For example, it does not put the actual use of wargames in the proper context as the wargaming sessions were well integrated in planning conferences. Neither does it put the actions of the main character leading the wargaming sessions into the proper context as that individual had no less than 3-4 different roles. Furthermore, recommendations made post-game imply that the wargames did in fact indicate the weaknesses of the plan, especially concering how the Japanese were to recieve notice of when the US Fleet left Pearl harbor and approached Midway. Finally, actual combat results from the wargames are very much in line with what an historical analysis would rule as likely results, based on all four major US-Japanese carrier battles of 1942. 

Not being able to read Swedish I cannot comment on the actual paper (yet), but with deft use of Google translate I may eventually resolve this problem, but for now here is Google rendering of the introduction:

Introduction 

The concept of war games includes several types of games and used with many diver-mitered ends. One of these is to act as support for the planning of a military operation consumes. It remains debatable whether war game can really be said to be of specific benefit to military operations. With the benefit is meant briefly the results and data to wargame creates during the planning process that precedes a military operation. Are these results indicative or misleading? In other words, there is a problem whether and to what extent results  from the wargame can be validated. It can also be discussed whether war game properly used in these contexts.

The immediate objective of this text is that starting from a known examples problematize the use and benefit of wargame support to military operations. This case, involving the Japanese planning for the Midway operation (June 1942) is a literature frequent examples of wargames. The example has other advantages, it shows including the extensive planning that preceded the operation. Furthermore, it is also this war game maybe also one of the most contested. One view often put forward concerning the Japanese wargame before Midway was that war game predicted what would happen, but this was ignored by managers. In addition, sometimes means that the war game was heavily biased in favor of one of the two sides. In short, the Japanese side of war gaming has sometimes been described as "a joke". Such an assessment may well tend to get a general assessment of the usefulness of war game. Thus, there is reason to look further into why the current example has criticized and thereby illuminate the any possible benefit a war game can contribute to a military operation.

Indeed, several cases are studied in order to more accurately demonstrate the potential benefits that the implementation of wargames have faced military operations. But because space in this text is limited, and so to some extent objective, only one case chosen to be studied. The naval battle of Midway is generally seen as one of the most important events in the Pacific during World War II. Thus, there is a substantial amount of literature dealing especially the naval battle, but also its context and consequences. This text has mainly used the sources commonly found in an analysis of Midway, for example Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan written by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya in the early 1950s and who are critical of the Japanese planning and, in particular, the war game was conducted. As a counterweight to Fuchida's book has Ugaki Matome's diary used. Ugaki was the game leader in the games that this chapter focuses on. These sources have been supplemented by the official Japanese history portrayal Rekishi ShOS ho Middowee Kaisen of 1971, and with subsequent publications such as Shattered Sword by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully from 2005. Someone comprehensive literature analysis of all the texts written about the naval battle of Midway will not be made. However, there is a need to sometimes clarify and clarify the context in which the current source is coming from. This is done in cases where the source material shows divergent interpretations

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first part describes clearly the historical development, various types of war games and central perspectives and models in the field. Among other things, describes the differences between the free and the rigid war game. The analysis is focused on the war game that has a bearing on military operations, and in particular the planning of a military operation. Consequently not included wargame whose purpose is primarily educational, research or amusement. Furthermore, the focus is primarily on the wargame deals with the operational level and neither the military strategy or the lower band level will be discussed more deeply. The second part of the text (Midway) constitutes the main empirical contribution that builds on the first part more theoretical and descriptive anchor

References

1. Elg, J., Krigsspel och militära operationer:den japanska planeringen införMidway 1942, from War Studies Yearbook 2007 (Swedish Defence College)