The Japanese war game in preparation for the Battle of Midway was easily the most notorious war game ever played. During the game the American side's airpower sank two Japanese carriers. Rear Admiral Ukagi Matome, Yamamoto's chief of staff and commander of their carrier force for the operation, unilaterally reversed the umpires' ruling on the loss of the carriers. The carriers were restored to the game, and the Japanese side went on to capture Midway. Weeks later, during the actual battle, the Americans sank the same two carriers, plus two more. This time Admiral Ukagi was not able to reach into the "dead pile" and replace his ships.
This morality play is arguably the most often told incident from the history of wargaming. While the above is true, it makes the argument against the Admiral more "open and shut" then was actually the case. Most authors fail to mention that the American aircraft that sank the carriers during the wargame were B-17s. In the actual battle the B-17 proved completely ineffective (they never hit an enemy ship), so, in a narrow sense, Ukagi was right. Still, Admiral Ukagi failed to address the issue the loss of his carriers in the wargame should have brought up - what if the American's get in the first hit? Would we have enough strength to win anyway?
This morality play is arguably the most often told incident from the history of wargaming. While the above is true, it makes the argument against the Admiral more "open and shut" then was actually the case. Most authors fail to mention that the American aircraft that sank the carriers during the wargame were B-17s. In the actual battle the B-17 proved completely ineffective (they never hit an enemy ship), so, in a narrow sense, Ukagi was right. Still, Admiral Ukagi failed to address the issue the loss of his carriers in the wargame should have brought up - what if the American's get in the first hit? Would we have enough strength to win anyway?
As far as I can tell from the sources used in earlier posts [2][3][4]Ugaki was the senior umpire for the games in question. The sources indicate that either Nagumo or representatives of his staff commanded the Nagumo force in the games. We have also seen that in the conditions of the game Ugaki's actions were arguably correct, as in a rather half harted way Caffrey concedes. The following remark about not addressing the issues that the loss of the carriers might have suggested is plainly false, a result of the gaming was that Nagumo was ordered to keep half of his torpedo bombers armed for anti-shipping strike in case the American carriers appeared unexpectedly. The issue of attack by Midway based aircraft had been addressed, they were a minor threat, as they proved to be in the battle. Also, any such issues were primarily the responsibility of Yamamoto and Nagumo. Ugaki's responsibility was that of Yamamoto's chief of staff and as far as can be told within the constraints of shite planning he discharged them as expected. The responsibility for the planning was collective and cannot be laid solely at the feet of Ugaki, as some of Yamomoto's admirers seem to have tried to do.
What is particularly amusing about this piece is the credentials of the author [5], we might expect better scholarship from a "Professor of Wargaming and Campaign Planning". It also confirms that an argument from authority is invalid, so the quote from Rubel in [4] must stand on the reason he gives for his opinion and not his position in the professional community.
References
1. Caffrey M., History of Wargames:Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming , Jan 2000, http://www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=WARGHIS2.htm&reader=long,
2. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-1.html
3. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-2.html
4. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-3.html
5. http://web.me.com/mgkkmk/Connections/Bio_Caffrey,_M.html
I would also add Dr. Alan Zimm's argument that restoring Kaga was appropriate for the New Caledonia and Fiji operations because these are chart exercises. If the carrier isn't available there's no point in playing out such a scenario. This indicates that if the asset is not available the operation has to change or be scrapped which is in effect, what happened: the loss of all four Japanese carriers at Midway postponed and later canceled the subsequent operations against the South Pacific bases.
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