More on the Japanese Midway Games

Never being one to leave things alone I want to say more about the last two sentences from the quote from [1] in the last post.

 Still, Admiral Ukagi failed to address the issue the loss of his carriers in the wargame should have brought up - what if the American's get in the first hit? Would we have enough strength to win anyway?

We can answer this at least partially by assuming that The Japanese believed that a deck load strike from a fleet carrier could mission kill or sink two carriers. This is what Wayne Hughes, page 100 [2], tells us was the belief of US carrier forces at the time. This is consistent with the hit rate achieved in the Indian Ocean raid by the Nagumo force, and probably consistent with initial inflated reports of the results of the 5th Carrier Division attacks at the Coral Sea.
The Japanese estimated that the Americans had two fleet carriers available to defend Midway, thus if the Japanese credited the Americans with the same level of performance they credited themselves with, a first strike from the Americans would neutralist four carriers. If this occurred before the Nagumo force launched a counter strike, in the initial games this would have left the Japanese with two operational carriers, sufficient to eliminate the US carrier force since the Nagumo force in those games had the full six fleet carriers. If the Nagumo force had only four carriers, as in the second set of games and on the day, then it would have been mission killed (and with subsequent American strikes probably all the Japanese carriers would have been sunk).

Now it is likely that the Japanese did not credit the Americans with comparable capability as they thought they themselves had. So now assume that the Japanese credited the Americans with the ability to mission kill or sink a single carrier with a deck load strike. Then the two American carriers, with a first strike before the Japanese had the chance to launch, would have neutralised two of the Nagumo force's carriers, leaving sufficient forces to eliminate the American carriers with a counter strike. Note, according to Hughes [2] this is the level of effectiveness displayed (more-or-less) by both carrier forces in the battles of 1942. While in the main games of the second set (24/25th May) when the American sortied the two forces exchanged strikes the level of Japanese casualties incurred are consistent with this assessment.

It seems that the Japanese were well aware that if the Americans got lucky the game would be up, and orders were issued to minimise the chance of such luck (pages 67-8 of [3]). On the day the game was up because the Americans did get lucky, and they had three rather than two carriers available.

With an average amount of luck on both sides, on the day we might expect an initial exchange of strikes with the result of three US carriers mission killed or sunk, and the same number of Japanese carriers mission killed or sunk. Then the Japanese would have been able to follow up and probably sink any US carriers still afloat from their remaining operational carrier. Since after the first strikes there are no remaining US carriers the Japanese have the chance to save any of their carriers that were not sunk.

It should be pointed out that even a loss of two carriers by the Nagumo force as a price for the elimination of the American carriers might have been too high a price for the Japanese. The Midway campaign was just a part of the Japanese plan for the second stage of the Pacific war, and the loss of two carriers might have been sufficient to compromise the viability of the subsequent operations in the South Pacific and against Johnston and the Hawaiian islands.

References
1. Caffrey M., History of Wargames:Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming , Jan 2000, http://www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=WARGHIS2.htm&reader=long
2. Hughes W. P., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Naval Institute Press, 2000
3. Parshall, J.B., Tully A.P, Shattered Sword, Potomac Books 2005

More Midway and the Fixed Wargame Hypothesis

What I like about the legend of the Japanese gaming of the midway campaign is that there is always more rubbish available to comment on. Here we have an extract from something written by Matthew Caffrey, on the Strategy Page website [1].

The Japanese war game in preparation for the Battle of Midway was easily the most notorious war game ever played. During the game the American side's airpower sank two Japanese carriers. Rear Admiral Ukagi Matome, Yamamoto's chief of staff and commander of their carrier force for the operation, unilaterally reversed the umpires' ruling on the loss of the carriers. The carriers were restored to the game, and the Japanese side went on to capture Midway. Weeks later, during the actual battle, the Americans sank the same two carriers, plus two more. This time Admiral Ukagi was not able to reach into the "dead pile" and replace his ships.

This morality play is arguably the most often told incident from the history of wargaming. While the above is true, it makes the argument against the Admiral more "open and shut" then was actually the case. Most authors fail to mention that the American aircraft that sank the carriers during the wargame were B-17s. In the actual battle the B-17 proved completely ineffective (they never hit an enemy ship), so, in a narrow sense, Ukagi was right. Still, Admiral Ukagi failed to address the issue the loss of his carriers in the wargame should have brought up - what if the American's get in the first hit? Would we have enough strength to win anyway?

As far as I can tell from the sources used in earlier posts [2][3][4]Ugaki was the senior umpire for the games in question. The sources indicate that either Nagumo or representatives of his staff commanded the Nagumo force in the games. We have also seen that in the conditions of the game Ugaki's actions were arguably correct, as in a rather half harted way Caffrey concedes. The following remark about not addressing the issues that the loss of the carriers might have suggested is plainly false, a result of the gaming was that Nagumo was ordered to keep half of his torpedo bombers armed for anti-shipping strike in case the American carriers appeared unexpectedly. The issue of attack by Midway based aircraft had been addressed, they were a minor threat, as they proved to be in the battle. Also, any such issues were primarily the responsibility of Yamamoto and Nagumo. Ugaki's responsibility was that of Yamamoto's chief of staff and as far as can be told within the constraints of shite planning he discharged them as expected. The responsibility for the planning was collective and cannot be laid solely at the feet of Ugaki, as some of Yamomoto's admirers seem to have tried to do.


What is particularly amusing about this piece is the credentials of the author [5], we might expect better scholarship from a "Professor of Wargaming and Campaign Planning". It also confirms that an argument from authority is invalid, so the quote from Rubel in [4] must stand on the reason he gives for his opinion and not his position in the professional community.

References
1. Caffrey M., History of Wargames:Toward a History Based Doctrine for Wargaming , Jan 2000, http://www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=WARGHIS2.htm&reader=long,
2. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-1.html
3. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-2.html
4. http://navalwargames.blogspot.com/2011/12/original-japanese-gaming-of-midway-pt-3.html
5. http://web.me.com/mgkkmk/Connections/Bio_Caffrey,_M.html

Original Japanese Gaming of Midway, Pt 3 Just Applying the Rules

Statement of Thesis
The case that I will attempt to make in this section is that there is no evidence that what transpired in the wargames before Midway was anything other than a standard application of the rules to the problem being studied. Though I don't have access to the IJN wargaming manual or rules I will present what the RN 1921 rules [9] say, and make the case that these were at least one possible influence on the IJN rules. I will also present an argument justifying Ugaki's actions describes in  Fuchida & Okumiya with support of a quote from Rubel [10]. Finally I will claim that the results of the gaming on the 25th of May ([7] and previous post) are consistent with what might be expected if the US carriers sortied and and there were an exchange of strikes, so there is no evidence no "cheating" at this point.

The Royal Navy Wargame, 1921
I don't have access to the rules/manuals that the IJN would have been using in 1942, does anyone? However a case can be made that they may well have been influenced by the RN's rules from 1921 [9]. The Anglo Japanese naval treaty (1902-23) expired shortly after the production of the RN's 1921 game, and so may have been available to Japan, or at least discussed between the two navies.

In these rules there is no random element, the results of an attack with a particular weapon system is deterministic, a fixed percentage of bombs/shell etc are deemed hits, but according to the instructions even such results might be adjusted if the result would be unrealistic. This is consistent with what is said, in those sections dealing with  Tactical Exercises  (but not confined to). The following quoted paragraphs give a taste of the relevant instructions:

4. Object of the Tactical Exercises
(i) To practice and test the results obtained in tactical investigations in the most practical manner possible as a preliminary to tests at sea.
(ii) To afford opportunity for practicing decentralisation of command and the full initiative of subordinate commanders in accordance with common doctrine and a particular plan of battle.

Items (iii) through (vi) snipped

5. Conduct of a Tactical Exercise- it is considered that no hard and fast method of assessing damages should be drawn up or adhered to, but that the value of an exercise lies chiefly in drawing attention to, and, where possible, in summing up the main points of the various tactical situations presented during an exercise at the time the occur,. With consequent opportunities for short discussion.

It is of little value to allow an exercise to continue or reach a conclusion if this is not done. Otherwise the situations are forgotten, and if obvious mistakes made by one or more officers taking part are allowed to pass, the results obtained may be entirely false.

A mistake that would obviously not occur in actual practice, but made owing to lack of time for preparation and dissemination of the C in C's tactical ideas, or to the unreal conditions of the tactical table, should at once be pointed out and the move put back and re-moved. This, however, does not apply to mistakes which may obviously occur in actual practice due to the practical difficulties which may obviously occur in actual practice due to the practical difficulties in co-operation on account of visibility etc.

Snip... 

Emphasis above the present author's

Clearly in the RN 1921 rules the redoing of events thought to be unreasonable (such as a fleet deploying before any relevant intelligence was available) would be the norm. Also, the adjustment of a unrealistic number of hits would be adjusted, and if a ship was sunk that on second thoughts should not have been this might well reappear.

The main point here, which is independent of whether the Japanese had access to the RN 1921 rules or not, is that the idea that such games were not competitive, and were to indicate the expected outcome of the operations represented was not a novelty at the time.

Rubel Quote
Rubel who may be considered as something of an authority on professional wargames writes [10]:

  The subjective nature of game-produced knowledge is nowhere clearer than in games that generate information that is bureaucratically or politically threatening to players or sponsors. It is all too easy either to ignore or put a favorable spin on game events or results that do not fit comfortably into existing doctrines or accepted theories. A notable historical example of this phenomenon was a war game conducted by the Japanese Combined Fleet staff prior to the Midway operation. Historians have made much of the fact that the umpires resurrected a Japanese carrier that had been sunk by American aircraft operating out of Midway, citing it as evidence of “victory disease.” In fact, however, the Japanese umpires were perfectly justified—a dice roll had given a highly improbable hit to level-flying bombers (that is, as opposed to dive-bombers), which had proven generally ineffective in attacking ships. They were properly attempting to prevent a capabilities game from becoming a dice game. However, at another point during the game it was asked what would happen if an American carrier task force ambushed Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s carrier force while it was raiding Midway, and that uncomfortable question seems to have been ignored. The existing plan was based on deception and surprise, tenets and war-fighting values dear to the Imperial Japanese Navy. To acknowledge the existence of an American task force northeast of Midway in a position to ambush Nagumo’s carriers would have been to discount the possibility of surprise. The Japanese planners simply did not want to admit that—it would have negated their plans, and there was no time to start again from scratch.At the very least the game should have suggested more extensive searches in that sector, but the plan was not modified even to that extent. It was easier to ignore this particular game outcome. 

Emphasis above the present author's

Results of the Actual Attacks that were "Adjusted" in the IJN games
If we allow reality to intrude we can look at what actually happened when the Nagumo force was attacked by Midway based aircraft in the battle (which is the gamed incident about which the controversy wages).

The airforces on Midway were significantly stronger than those expected by the Japanese, though possibly not greater than what they would expect had the Americans had sufficient warning of their intentions. From the Nagumo force battle report [11] we know that their estimate of the air strength on Midway was 2 squadrons of reconnaissance flying boats (Catalinas), 1 squadron of Army bombers (B17?), and 1 squadron of fighters. Compared to an actual strength of 32 Catalinas, 6 Avenger Torpedo Bombers, 27 fighters (20 Buffalos, and 7 Wildcats), 27 scout/dive bombers (11 Vindicators, 16 Dauntless), 23 army bombers (4 B26s, 19 B17s) (Prange [4] order of battle).

Soryu under B17 Attack at Midway (Photo# USAF ID 4884)

When attacked piecemeal by the Midway airgroup the Nagumo Force suffered no significant damage, CAP and evasive manoeuvres sufficed to keep them undamaged. This compares with nine, or three hits from high level bombers (which were known to be ineffective against ships free to manoeuvre) in the games. So reality does not contradict the umpires judgement that 9 hits were too many, and second thoughts that even 3 hits were too many.

Concluding remark
One of the surprising things about the Japanese gaming before Midway is that numbers of hits were determined by dice at all, but given that they were it is reasonable to correct for "lucky dice" in the context of the type of exercise in which they were engaged.

We may presume that both F&O knew how the games on Yamato were supposed to be organised (indeed one of them was an umpire in these games) since they were staff officers (at that time or later, but before publication of their book) who had been involved in earlier games of this nature. So we have to ask why they reported these games in the way they did? It is again folklore about the pacific war, but it may have some element of truth in it, that Yamamoto's followers sought to protect his reputation. So the reports of the games could have been an attempt to unload more than his own share of responsibility for the failure of the Midway operation onto Ugaki. It also possibly serves to deflect criticism from F&O for their part in the planning/gaming of the campaign.

References
1. Willson A., War gaming, Pelican Books 1970
2. Curry J. (Ed), Thomas Allen's War Games, Professional Wargaming 1945-1985, History of Wargaming Project 2009.
3. Fuchida M., Okumiya M,, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan, Naval Institute Press, 1955
4. Prange G.W., Miracle at Midway, McGraw-Hill, 1982
5. Moulé V.A., A Comparison of Operational Leadership in the Battle of Midway, A paper submitted to the Naval War College as part of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations, 1995
6.Willmott H.P., The Sword and the Javelin, Naval Institute Press, 1983.
7. Parshall, J.B., Tully A.P, Shattered Sword, Potomac Books 2005
8. Goldstein D., Dillon K., The Pearl Harbor Papers, Potomac Books, 1999
9. Curry J. (Ed), The Fred Jane Naval War Game (1906) Including the Royal Navy's Wargaming Rules (1921), The History of the Wargame Project, 2008
10. Rubel R.C., The Epistemology of War Gaming, Naval War College Review, Spring 2006
11.Nagumo force staff, CinC First Air Fleet Detailed Battle Report No. 6, in The Japanese Story of the battle of Midway, ONI Review, May 1947, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/Nagumo/

Original Japanese Gaming of Midway, Pt 2 The Fixed Wargame Theory

In many accounts of the history of Wargaming [1][2] and the Midway Campaign [3][4] we find the story of how the umpires cheated by not allowing hits that the dice dictated on the Japanese carriers. This occurs not just in history books but is repeated by serving officers in their academic work, an example from 1995 is the following from Moulé [5], she writes:

Yamamoto called together his subordinate commanders at the Battleship Yamato on May 1, 1942 for a briefing. This was the first time that Nagumo and Kondo were exposed to the plan and each saw serious problems with it. Nagumo did not argue since he felt he was already on negative terms with Yamamoto who heavily criticized him for not conducting a follow-on strike at Pearl Harbor. Kondo on the other hand, was more outspoken and voiced his concerns, but Yamamoto was not open to discussion. He told Kondo that the plan was credible since it was written by senior staff officers and he had no intentions of changing it. Kondo asked how the Midway occupation forces would be resupplied; If they could not be, they would have to be withdrawn, thus making the occupation pointless. Yamamoto's Chief of Staff admitted that it might be impossible to resupply Midway, which left some question as to its purpose. That same day, a major war game began during which several other flaws in the plan came to light. Yamamoto overlooked these flaws since officially his plan won, but only because the umpires  fixed all the rulings in its favor

This is apparently a quote from Willmott[6], this appears to be a para-phrase of Willmott, on page 111 he repeats Fuchida and Okumiya's story (the index does not reference war game/s or wargame/s so this is a pig to find! To find the wargame discussion you have to follow the Ugaki entries in the index). Also there is no separate mention of the second set of games.

All of these accounts seem to go back to Fuchida and Okumiya's apparently first hand account reported in [3], the best contain direct quotes, but many others contain half baked précis versions that look partially like the result of a game of Chinese whispers. Since Fuchida and Okumiya seem to be a primary source for this story I will quote them at length:

   Except for the staff of Combined Fleet Headquarters, all those taking part in the war games were amazed at this at this formidable program (present author's note: Not only the Midway and Aleutian operations but subsequent operations to occupy positions in New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands, strikes against Australia and finally occupation of Johnston Island and Hawaii), which seemed to have been dreamed up with a great deal more imagination than regard for reality. Still more amazing,however, was the manner in which every operation from the invasion of Midway and the Aleutians down to the assault on Johnson and Hawaii was carried out in the games without the slightest difficulty. This was due in no small measure to the highhanded conduct of Read Admiral Ugaki, the presiding officer, who frequently intervened to set aside rulings made by the umpires.
   In the tabletop manoeuvres, for example, a situation developed in which the Nagumo Force underwent a bombing attack by enemy land-based aircraft while its own planes were off attacking Midway. In accordance with the rules, Lieutenant Commander Okumiya, Carrier Division 4 staff officer who was acting as an umpire, cast dice to determine the bombing results and ruled that there had been nine enemy hits on the Japanese carriers, Both AKAGI and KAGA were listed as sunk. Admiral Ugaki, however, arbitrarily reduced the number of hits to only three which resulted in KAGA still being ruled sunk but AKAGI only slightly damaged. To Okumiya's surprise, even this revised ruling was subsequently cancelled, and KAGA reappeared as a participant in the next part of the games covering the New Caledonia and Fiji Islands invasions. The verdicts of the umpires regarding the results of air fighting were similarly juggled, always in favor of the Japanese forces.

Prange [4] mentions the table top games at three points the first is to the games that we are considering here of May 1st, in chapter 4; where on page 31 we have a brief summary of what is in [3], then again on page 35 where we learn that Ugaki was concerned about the Nagumo forces plans to deal with the American carriers if they should sortie, which seem to have been dismissed with a content free expression of confidence (one touch of an armoured sleeve) by Genda, air staff officer of the Nagumo force. The naming of Genda here is an amplification of what is in [3] and is attributed to Genda himself. Also on page 35 we have the story about the hits on the AKAGI and KAGA from [3] repeated but with some ambiguity about what the nature of the strike was. On page 36 we learn that in the games the American fleet did not sortie, and this uncharacteristic behaviour was of concern to Genda. The second mention is in chapter 8, but refers only in passing to additional games on May 24th of which there is no real detail (which again mirrors [3]). The final mention is in chapter 40 where the games are referred to as rigged. So in conclusion we find Prange adds very little to Fuchida and Okumiya's account other than the name and exact words of  the staff officer who was off hand about how the Nagumo force would cope if the American Carriers appeared on the battle field (the account in Fuchida and Okumiya is not reproduced in the quote above).

Yamamoto (Centre) Ugaki (left) and staff Early 1940's on Nagato

I could go on quoting books on this but there are more books on Midway that I can shake a stick at, so I will conclude with one more relatively modern tome by Parshall and Tully [7].  Parshall and Tully begin the narrative on the wargames with a description of an initial run, in the series that started on May 1st, where the American carriers sortied early and hit three of the Japanese Carriers. This initial round was ruled impossible (presumably because the Americans sortied before they could have on the basis of reconnaissance from Midway) see note 1.

They then proceed to give the Fuchida and Okumiya[3] story with additional detail from Prange[4].  Finally we learn some detail of the second set of games that took place on the 25th of May (the day before the Nagumo force was due to sail). In these the Americans do sortie and the result of the encounter is the loss of both US carriers and one Japanese carrier sunk and two damaged. In this second set of games the Nagumo force presumably contained only the four available carriers rather than all six of the initial set). They do not suggest any fixing in this second set of games, and again Yamamoto was reassured by Nagumo's staff that they could handle such eventualities. Also the question of the positioning of the main body were it could not effectively support the Nagumo force was raised by some present but not acted upon. This outcome of this final set of games does not look like the result of fixing, they were not what the Japanese wanted to see, since the casualties would invalidate the time table and plans for the subsequent operations that were the intention for the remainder of 1942. These results may not have been taken to heart but the warnings were there.

Note 1
I have checked the source which according to the notes is [8] page 348. This is a reprint of a pamphlet by Masataka Chihaya which is an under researched emotional tirade written in 1946 by an ex IJN officer against everything that the IJN did in the war. The anecdote itself is reported second hand without attribution. There is no information in the story that would allow it to be placed at a particular point in the time line of the games. It is such good material for their case that the games were fixed it is surprising that Fuchida and Okumiya (who were present at least at the first set of games) do not mention it. That this event took place in the second set of games seems possible, it may refer to the second scenario describes in the description of the second set of games.  I think we should discount it, and certainly without further support Parshall and Tully should not have just made stuff up so that this would fit into their story. This sort of thing make it necessary to check everything that Parshall and Tully write.


References
1. Willson A., War gaming, Pelican Books 1970
2. Curry J. (Ed), Thomas Allen's War Games, Professional Wargaming 1945-1985, History of Wargaming Project 2009.
3. Fuchida M., Okumiya M,, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan, Naval Institute Press, 1955
4. Prange G.W., Miracle at Midway, McGraw-Hill, 1982
5. Moulé V.A., A Comparison of Operational Leadership in the Battle of Midway, A paper submitted to the Naval War College as part of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations, 1995
6.Willmott H.P., The Sword and the Javelin, Naval Institute Press, 1983.
7. Parshall, J.B., Tully A.P, Shattered Sword, Potomac Books 2005
8. Goldstein D., Dillon K., The Pearl Harbor Papers, Potomac Books, 1999

Original Japanese Gaming of Midway, Pt 1 Introduction

It is almost folkloric that the table top manoeuvres/war games conducted by the Japanese navy as a part of the planning and briefing process in preparation for the Midway operations in the spring of 1942 were rigged so that everything went according to the Combined Fleet's plans.

In the next post I will describe the sources for this belief and its wide spread appearance in the literature on the Midway campaign. I will also indicate the inconsistency of this belief with some contemporary accounts.

In the third post I will indicate that the so called fixing was in fact the umpires correcting extreme dice results that in themselves would have invalidated the exercise, and how in the under reported second round of games results that were unfavourable to the plan were not over ruled and orders given to mitigate the unfavourable outcomes (which for one reason or another were  ignored). In this post I also marshal the only published support for the present thesis that I have found.

Final Comments on Murfett's "Naval Warfare 1919-45"

In the last two posts I have been critical of some aspects of Murfett's book [1]. Well I have finally finished it and can say that it is redeemed by the extensive discussion in the conclusions (pages 462-499). These discuss who did and did not perform well, who was lucky and/or unlucky the importance of logistics and many other things that should be of interest to naval wargames and those interested in the history of naval operations.

This chapter on its own transforms my recommendation about this work to a "should read" from an "interesting but annoying"

May be I should also record that Murfett's account of Soviet/Eastern Front naval operations covers material unfamiliar to me, and so is another plus in the books favour.

References:

1. Murfett, M., Naval Warfare 1919-45; An operational history of the war at sea, Routlege, 2009

More Comments on Murfett's "Naval Warfare 1919-45"

I am still struggling on with this [1], nearing the end now, but have to report this gem:

"Strangely, the Japanese submarine fleet with unquestionably the best torpedo amongst the active combatants - the Type 93 or 'Long Lance', and the even faster, longer range Type 95 - did not make as big a mark on the Pacific Campaign as they ought to have done."

I won't quibble about the use to the name 'Long Lance', but note it is not a contemporary Japanese name for these weapons.

Type 93: 24" surface ship oxygen torpedo, not a submarine torpedo

Type 95: 21" submarine oxygen torpedo (and I'm not sure that Morrison applied the term 'Long Lance' to this).

Of these the Type 93 is very much the longer range weapon (as would be expected given its greater size - other things being equal). Also there is no significant difference between their top speeds.

What galls me about this is that these things are common knowledge among those with an interest in (relatively) modern naval warfare and if you do not know about such things they can be looked up on-line without any trouble. So why does Murfett not know these things? One slip is excusable, we all make mistakes, but Murfett does this again and again. Another example is his overselling of MAD, which could be useful in conjunction with sonobuoys and Fido but on its own of very little value.

References:

1. Murfett, M., Naval Warfare 1919-45; An operational history of the war at sea, Routlege, 2009