Original Japanese Gaming of Midway, Pt 2 The Fixed Wargame Theory

In many accounts of the history of Wargaming [1][2] and the Midway Campaign [3][4] we find the story of how the umpires cheated by not allowing hits that the dice dictated on the Japanese carriers. This occurs not just in history books but is repeated by serving officers in their academic work, an example from 1995 is the following from Moulé [5], she writes:

Yamamoto called together his subordinate commanders at the Battleship Yamato on May 1, 1942 for a briefing. This was the first time that Nagumo and Kondo were exposed to the plan and each saw serious problems with it. Nagumo did not argue since he felt he was already on negative terms with Yamamoto who heavily criticized him for not conducting a follow-on strike at Pearl Harbor. Kondo on the other hand, was more outspoken and voiced his concerns, but Yamamoto was not open to discussion. He told Kondo that the plan was credible since it was written by senior staff officers and he had no intentions of changing it. Kondo asked how the Midway occupation forces would be resupplied; If they could not be, they would have to be withdrawn, thus making the occupation pointless. Yamamoto's Chief of Staff admitted that it might be impossible to resupply Midway, which left some question as to its purpose. That same day, a major war game began during which several other flaws in the plan came to light. Yamamoto overlooked these flaws since officially his plan won, but only because the umpires  fixed all the rulings in its favor

This is apparently a quote from Willmott[6], this appears to be a para-phrase of Willmott, on page 111 he repeats Fuchida and Okumiya's story (the index does not reference war game/s or wargame/s so this is a pig to find! To find the wargame discussion you have to follow the Ugaki entries in the index). Also there is no separate mention of the second set of games.

All of these accounts seem to go back to Fuchida and Okumiya's apparently first hand account reported in [3], the best contain direct quotes, but many others contain half baked précis versions that look partially like the result of a game of Chinese whispers. Since Fuchida and Okumiya seem to be a primary source for this story I will quote them at length:

   Except for the staff of Combined Fleet Headquarters, all those taking part in the war games were amazed at this at this formidable program (present author's note: Not only the Midway and Aleutian operations but subsequent operations to occupy positions in New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands, strikes against Australia and finally occupation of Johnston Island and Hawaii), which seemed to have been dreamed up with a great deal more imagination than regard for reality. Still more amazing,however, was the manner in which every operation from the invasion of Midway and the Aleutians down to the assault on Johnson and Hawaii was carried out in the games without the slightest difficulty. This was due in no small measure to the highhanded conduct of Read Admiral Ugaki, the presiding officer, who frequently intervened to set aside rulings made by the umpires.
   In the tabletop manoeuvres, for example, a situation developed in which the Nagumo Force underwent a bombing attack by enemy land-based aircraft while its own planes were off attacking Midway. In accordance with the rules, Lieutenant Commander Okumiya, Carrier Division 4 staff officer who was acting as an umpire, cast dice to determine the bombing results and ruled that there had been nine enemy hits on the Japanese carriers, Both AKAGI and KAGA were listed as sunk. Admiral Ugaki, however, arbitrarily reduced the number of hits to only three which resulted in KAGA still being ruled sunk but AKAGI only slightly damaged. To Okumiya's surprise, even this revised ruling was subsequently cancelled, and KAGA reappeared as a participant in the next part of the games covering the New Caledonia and Fiji Islands invasions. The verdicts of the umpires regarding the results of air fighting were similarly juggled, always in favor of the Japanese forces.

Prange [4] mentions the table top games at three points the first is to the games that we are considering here of May 1st, in chapter 4; where on page 31 we have a brief summary of what is in [3], then again on page 35 where we learn that Ugaki was concerned about the Nagumo forces plans to deal with the American carriers if they should sortie, which seem to have been dismissed with a content free expression of confidence (one touch of an armoured sleeve) by Genda, air staff officer of the Nagumo force. The naming of Genda here is an amplification of what is in [3] and is attributed to Genda himself. Also on page 35 we have the story about the hits on the AKAGI and KAGA from [3] repeated but with some ambiguity about what the nature of the strike was. On page 36 we learn that in the games the American fleet did not sortie, and this uncharacteristic behaviour was of concern to Genda. The second mention is in chapter 8, but refers only in passing to additional games on May 24th of which there is no real detail (which again mirrors [3]). The final mention is in chapter 40 where the games are referred to as rigged. So in conclusion we find Prange adds very little to Fuchida and Okumiya's account other than the name and exact words of  the staff officer who was off hand about how the Nagumo force would cope if the American Carriers appeared on the battle field (the account in Fuchida and Okumiya is not reproduced in the quote above).

Yamamoto (Centre) Ugaki (left) and staff Early 1940's on Nagato

I could go on quoting books on this but there are more books on Midway that I can shake a stick at, so I will conclude with one more relatively modern tome by Parshall and Tully [7].  Parshall and Tully begin the narrative on the wargames with a description of an initial run, in the series that started on May 1st, where the American carriers sortied early and hit three of the Japanese Carriers. This initial round was ruled impossible (presumably because the Americans sortied before they could have on the basis of reconnaissance from Midway) see note 1.

They then proceed to give the Fuchida and Okumiya[3] story with additional detail from Prange[4].  Finally we learn some detail of the second set of games that took place on the 25th of May (the day before the Nagumo force was due to sail). In these the Americans do sortie and the result of the encounter is the loss of both US carriers and one Japanese carrier sunk and two damaged. In this second set of games the Nagumo force presumably contained only the four available carriers rather than all six of the initial set). They do not suggest any fixing in this second set of games, and again Yamamoto was reassured by Nagumo's staff that they could handle such eventualities. Also the question of the positioning of the main body were it could not effectively support the Nagumo force was raised by some present but not acted upon. This outcome of this final set of games does not look like the result of fixing, they were not what the Japanese wanted to see, since the casualties would invalidate the time table and plans for the subsequent operations that were the intention for the remainder of 1942. These results may not have been taken to heart but the warnings were there.

Note 1
I have checked the source which according to the notes is [8] page 348. This is a reprint of a pamphlet by Masataka Chihaya which is an under researched emotional tirade written in 1946 by an ex IJN officer against everything that the IJN did in the war. The anecdote itself is reported second hand without attribution. There is no information in the story that would allow it to be placed at a particular point in the time line of the games. It is such good material for their case that the games were fixed it is surprising that Fuchida and Okumiya (who were present at least at the first set of games) do not mention it. That this event took place in the second set of games seems possible, it may refer to the second scenario describes in the description of the second set of games.  I think we should discount it, and certainly without further support Parshall and Tully should not have just made stuff up so that this would fit into their story. This sort of thing make it necessary to check everything that Parshall and Tully write.


References
1. Willson A., War gaming, Pelican Books 1970
2. Curry J. (Ed), Thomas Allen's War Games, Professional Wargaming 1945-1985, History of Wargaming Project 2009.
3. Fuchida M., Okumiya M,, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan, Naval Institute Press, 1955
4. Prange G.W., Miracle at Midway, McGraw-Hill, 1982
5. Moulé V.A., A Comparison of Operational Leadership in the Battle of Midway, A paper submitted to the Naval War College as part of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations, 1995
6.Willmott H.P., The Sword and the Javelin, Naval Institute Press, 1983.
7. Parshall, J.B., Tully A.P, Shattered Sword, Potomac Books 2005
8. Goldstein D., Dillon K., The Pearl Harbor Papers, Potomac Books, 1999